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1 Introduction
The effects of lending programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on economic
growth and other variables have been extensively investigated.1 A major challenge for
identifying causal effects of IMF programs is to address selection into such agreements,
which is often modeled by binary choice models (e.g. Heckman, 1979; Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). These models attribute program participation to various economic and
political determinants and their ability to correctly predict the participation of a country
in an agreement in a given year is crucial for bias correction.2
A big part of IMF lending is concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where IMF
programs are often more frequent than in other regions of the world (Marchesi and Sirtori,
2011). Poor macro-economic conditions in SSA might be a cause; yet, economic variables
that are strong predictors of IMF programs in other regions have been found to have
only limited power to explain IMF lending in Africa (Stone, 2004). Stone (2004) found
evidence that the politics of the IMF might work differently in Africa, where the IMF’s
major shareholders interfere with the enforcement of loan conditions.
Understanding whether also the initiation of IMF agreements in SSA follows different
considerations than in other regions of the world (ROW) can help to improve the prediction
of a country’s program participation and thus has important implications for the correction
of selection bias in applied research.3 Yet, in what respect IMF lending strategies are
different in SSA has not been systematically investigated.
Several factors make SSA subject of potentially different lending decisions: SSA is home
to the highest share of least developed and heavily indebted poor countries; countries in
SSA have become independent quite recently, which may reinforce preferential treatment
by their former colonizers (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000);4 the largest share of external
debt is owed to official creditors, rather than the private sector (e.g. Helleiner, 1992).
In this note we investigate (i) whether potential differences in the engagement of countries
in SSA with the IMF are related to differences in their economic and political environments,
and (ii) whether some of their characteristics have a different effect on the probability
1 For recent studies on macroeconomic effects see e.g. Dreher and Walter (2010); Jorra (2012); Bird and
Rowlands (2017) and for social and political outcomes Dreher and Gassebner (2012); Clements et al.
(2013); Oberdabernig (2013); Casper (2015); Nelson and Wallace (2016); Stubbs et al. (2016).
2 For papers on the determinants of IMF programs see e.g. Joyce (1992); Sturm et al. (2005); Andersen
et al. (2006); Harrigan et al. (2006); Dreher and Vreeland (2009) and Moser and Sturm (2011).
3 If the initiation of IMF programs is driven by different factors across regions, pooling the regions to
estimate the selection model may result in a worse prediction of a country’s program participation, and
thus weaken the power of models for bias correction.
4 Western colonizers might cater to their former colonies by exerting influence on IMF lending decisions
through their voting shares.
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of initiating an IMF agreement as compared to ROW. If we find evidence for a different
decision making process in SSA and ROW, this has to be taken into account when modeling
the selection of countries into IMF programs.
2 Data and methodology
Our baseline analysis uses data provided by Moser and Sturm (2011), who evaluated the
robustness of a large number of potential determinants of signing an agreement with the
IMF for the period 1990–2009. The dataset covers 14 economic and 14 political variables,
X, which are used to predict the initiation of a new IMF arrangement, Y , in a given year,
P (Y = 1|X).
ROW sample SSA sample
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Signature of agreement 0.215 0.412 0.222 0.417
International reserves 3.871 2.050 2.589 1.685
Real GDP growth 3.699 4.325 3.536 4.517
Log(GDP pc) 7.400 0.810 5.736 0.871
Investment 21.053 5.683 18.129 5.526
Debt service 21.841 14.099 19.848 13.400
External debt (% of GNI) 59.886 40.907 107.737 48.816
External balance (% of GDP) -4.328 7.949 -8.351 10.032
Economic globalization (KOF index) 51.590 14.002 36.854 9.864
Terms of trade adjustment -0.779 3.847 -0.238 7.679
Inflation 13.853 17.416 11.024 12.825
Government budget deficit 15.401 11.014 7.453 4.605
Fixed exchange rate 0.162 0.369 0.444 0.498
Currency crisis 0.081 0.273 0.101 0.302
Financial openness 0.104 1.408 -0.634 1.005
Share of past 5 years with IMF 0.242 0.206 0.290 0.180
Lagged executive elections 0.147 0.355 0.169 0.376
Lagged legislative elections 0.254 0.436 0.212 0.410
Lead executive elections 0.145 0.352 0.185 0.389
Lead legislative elections 0.247 0.432 0.212 0.410
Political instability 0.458 1.853 -0.413 0.461
Social unrest 0.429 1.680 -0.199 0.841
Political rights and civil liberties 3.350 1.312 4.349 1.176
Political globalization (KOF index) 69.193 15.531 59.469 14.935
Quality of government 0.494 0.149 0.428 0.106
UN Security Council membership 0.098 0.298 0.048 0.214
Share in world GDP 0.311 0.495 0.017 0.010
Trade with US 0.106 0.112 0.042 0.077
Vote in line with the US in UNGA 0.310 0.118 0.269 0.083
Observations 469 189
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
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The economic determinants include international reserves, real GDP growth, GDP per
capita, investment, debt service, external debt, external balance of goods and services,
economic globalization, terms of trade adjustment, inflation, government budget deficit,
dummies for fixed exchange rate and currency crisis, and a measure for financial openness.
The political determinants include the moving average of an IMF program dummy for the
past 5 years, dummies for lagged and lead executive and legislative elections, political
instability, social unrest, a political rights and civil liberties index, political globalization,
quality of government, a dummy for UN Security Council membership, the country’s share
in world GDP, trade with the US, and an indicator for voting in line with the US in the
UN General Assembly.5 In addition to these variables, we include year dummies in X in
order to account for common time effects. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the
variables that form part of our analysis, for ROW and SSA.
We estimate Bayesian logit models (equation 1) to explain the initiation of IMF agreements
for SSA and for ROW separately, including the full set of covariates and time effects.
P (Y = 1|X) = Λ(X ′β) (1)
β is the parameter vector and Λ is the logistic distribution function. Bayesian estimation
methods apply Bayes’ rule to derive information about the parameters β from the data y.
p(β|y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
∝ p(y|β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
p(β)︸︷︷︸
prior
(2)
The posterior density is proportional to the likelihood function times the prior density.
We use a prior with 0 mean and precision 0.0001 (see also Polson and Scott, 2011; Polson
et al., 2013). The posterior mean for variable k is given by
E(βk|y) = 1
S
S∑
s=1
βsk, (3)
5 We had to exclude a measure of short-term debt because of its limited coverage. As this variable turned
out to be significant in only 0.2% of all estimated models by Moser and Sturm (2011), this is likely
to be of minor importance. Furthermore, we updated the data on the quality of government from the
ICRG because the dataset provided by Moser and Sturm contained only missing values for this variable.
We kept only observations for which data on all variables is available, what resulted in an unbalanced
panel that covers the period 1990–2004. Information on the country-year coverage of the final sample
is provided in Table A.1 in Appendix A. For a more detailed description of the variables see Moser and
Sturm (2011).
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where S is the number of draws from the posterior. Numerical p-values are derived as
pk =
1
S
S∑
s=1
I
(
βsk
E(βk|y) > 0
)
, (4)
where I is the indicator function.6 We combine three Markov Chains of S = 100, 000
iterations each, and check their convergence using Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) convergence
diagnostic.
Bayesian estimation techniques are particularly suited for dealing with small samples since
inference does not rely on a large number of observations but on the number of samples,
S, taken from the posterior. The Bayesian framework, furthermore, allows to use informa-
tion on parameter estimates from our baseline analysis as prior information in additional
robustness checks that rely on smaller sample sizes. We will return to this in section 4.
The results of the Bayesian logit regressions feed into a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
(Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973; Yun 2004; Fairlie 2005) that splits the difference in the prob-
ability of entering an IMF agreement between the regions into a part that results from
differences in economic or political environments (difference in characteristics) and a part
that stems from differences in the influence of those characteristics on the probability of
receiving an IMF loan (difference in parameters):7
P (Y ssa = 1|Xssa)− P (Y row = 1|Xrow) =
=
[
Λ(Xssaβrow)− Λ(Xrowβrow)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in characteristics, ∆Xk
+
[
Λ(Xssaβssa)− Λ(Xssaβrow)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in parameters, ∆bk
(5)
The contribution of an individual covariate k to ∆Xk and ∆
b
k is derived as in Kaiser (2015):
∆Xk =
1
N rowN ssa
Nrow∑
i
Nssa∑
j
[
Λ(Xssaj β
row)− Λ(Xrowi βrow)
] (Xssajk −Xrowik )βrowk
(Xssaj −Xrowi )βrow
∆bk =
1
N rowN ssa
Nrow∑
i
Nssa∑
j
[
Λ(Xssaj β
ssa)− Λ(Xssai βrow)
] Xssajk (βssak − βrowk )
Xssaj (β
ssa − βrow) (6)
If the signature of IMF agreements follows the same process in SSA and ROW we will
observe statistically significant effects for differences in characteristics only, but not for
differences in parameters. On the other hand, if the determinants of signing an agree-
ment differ across the regions the difference in parameters will be statistically significant
6 The calculation of the p-values corresponds to counting the proportion of draws for which βsk is equally
signed as its posterior mean E(βk|y).
7 ROW serves as the base group. Λ(Xβ) = 1/N
∑N
i Λ(Xiβ̂) and i is an observation.
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and better prediction of program participation can be obtained by accounting for this
heterogeneity.
3 Results
Table 2 reports the results of the decomposition analysis. 22.2% of the observations in
SSA have signed an agreement with the IMF; in ROW this number amounts to 21.5%.8
The column labeled difference in characteristics summarizes the impact of observable con-
ditions that are systematically different in SSA as compared to ROW. The logit estimates
(in Table B.1 in Appendix B) suggest that higher external debt increases the probability
of entering an IMF agreement (in the base group for the decomposition, ROW), which
makes countries in SSA 4.5 percentage points more likely to enter on account of their
higher debt levels. By contrast, a higher external balance contributes to a lower prospect
of initiating an agreement, making countries in SSA 2.7 percentage points more likely to
sign. Finally, in our sample countries in ROW are more likely to engage with the IMF if
they have been part of an agreement in the previous five years; the larger share of past
program years in SSA leads to a 0.4 percentage point higher likelihood of signing a new
agreement. While other factors such as differences in GDP per capita or economic glob-
alization have a quantitatively important contribution to the difference in characteristics
part, their effect is estimated rather imprecisely, resulting in numerical p-values (slightly)
above 0.1.
Turning to the more important question of whether a country’s characteristics have dif-
ferent impacts on the conclusion of new lending agreements in SSA, the column labeled
difference in parameters in Table 2 indicates that the effects of some economic but also
certain political variables are substantially different in SSA as compared to ROW. The
logit results in Table B.1 show that in SSA higher debt levels decrease the likelihood of
signing a new agreement, while in ROW the opposite applies; this contributes to a 24.3
percentage points lower probability of concluding a new program in SSA. Furthermore,
while a higher share of years under an IMF agreement in the past raises the probability of
signing a new agreement in ROW, the effect in SSA is the opposite, contributing to a 19.1
percentage points lower likelihood of entering an agreement in SSA. Also voting patterns
in the UN General Assembly have a different influence on the initiation of agreements in
ROW and SSA. In SSA, voting proximity with the US increases the likelihood of signing
an agreement substantially, while the positive effect is much lower in ROW; as a result
8 Although this gap is not statistically significant, this does not preclude different decision making pro-
cesses to be in force across the regions. For selection bias correction to be effective, individual countries’
program participation has to be correctly predicted, rather than aggregate shares.
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voting patterns contribute to a 25 percentage points higher probability of concluding an
IMF agreement in SSA. The effects of all other variables have a numerical p-value larger
than 0.1 in the decomposition analysis, although their quantitative effect is sometimes
rather important.9
SSA ROW
Probability of signing agreement 22.222 *** (0.000) 21.535 *** (0.000)
difference in difference in
characteristics parameters
International reserves 0.941 (0.395) 1.073 (0.861)
Real GDP growth 0.076 (0.376) 1.509 (0.571)
Log(GDP pc) -7.797 (0.123) 4.748 (0.921)
Investment 0.498 (0.616) 5.772 (0.723)
Debt service -0.382 (0.105) -3.394 (0.601)
External debt (% of GNI) 4.475 ** (0.037) -24.255 ** (0.015)
External balance (% of GDP) 2.678 *** (0.003) 3.102 (0.597)
Economic globalization (KOF index) 4.633 (0.133) 28.740 (0.113)
Terms of trade adjustment 0.082 (0.965) -0.361 (0.585)
Inflation -0.333 (0.268) 2.122 (0.661)
Government budget deficit -0.215 (0.895) 2.259 (0.736)
Fixed exchange rate 0.652 (0.647) 3.865 (0.383)
Currency crisis -0.026 (0.637) -1.188 (0.152)
Financial openness -1.341 (0.249) 1.168 (0.549)
Share of past 5 years with IMF 0.438 ** (0.040) -19.09 *** (0.009)
Lagged executive elections 0.188 (0.220) 0.835 (0.669)
Lagged legislative elections -0.246 (0.199) 1.653 (0.439)
Lead executive elections -0.022 (0.792) -0.955 (0.524)
Lead legislative elections -0.141 (0.379) 0.815 (0.667)
Political instability -0.084 (0.913) -1.665 (0.576)
Social unrest -0.651 (0.293) 0.328 (0.847)
Political rights and civil liberties -1.556 (0.289) -11.441 (0.308)
Political globalization (KOF index) -1.09 (0.393) -9.808 (0.505)
Quality of government 1.257 (0.129) 8.483 (0.617)
UN Security Council membership 0.204 (0.312) -0.302 (0.489)
Share in world GDP -0.227 (0.888) 10.563 (0.108)
Trade with US 1.195 (0.287) 3.667 (0.196)
Vote in line with the US in UNGA -1.444 (0.136) 24.964 * (0.076)
Time dummies (joint effect) 0.067 (0.823) -34.349 (0.475)
Contribution to total difference 1.828 (0.724) -1.141 (0.845)
Note: Numerical p-values, based on the sign of the parameter estimates of
the Markov chains, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 2: Decomposition results
Our findings are in line with the arguments in the introduction. The lower probability of
countries in SSA to conclude a new lending program if they had an active agreement with
the IMF in the past five years could stem from the on average longer program duration in
9 Especially economic globalization, share in world GDP, and time effects have a quantitatively important
contribution to the difference in parameters part. Yet, their numerical p-values are (slightly) above 0.1.
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this region, where concessional lending is more likely than in ROW. Additionally, the debt
structure in SSA may impact on the willingness of the IMF to support countries with a
lending agreement, resulting in a negative effect of higher levels of debt on IMF program
initiation (see also Helleiner, 1992). Moreover, similar arguments to those of Stone (2004),
that IMF lending is highly politicized in SSA, might account for the particularly strong
influence of UN voting patterns on program initiation in SSA.
4 Robustness
To test the robustness of our results we add five additional variables to the set of base-
line regressors: government expenditure as a share of GDP, a country’s share of IMF
quotas, ethnic fractionalization, the share of seats of parties representing special interests
(religious, nationalistic, regional, and rural) in parliament, and a political cohesion index
(see Sturm et al., 2005, for details).10 Because the inclusion of these variables results in
smaller sample sizes, we make use of information derived from the baseline analysis. More
specifically, we use the parameter estimates from the analysis above as prior means for
the baseline controls and the inverse of ten times their squared standard errors as prior
precision, and specify the priors for the five new variables like in section 2.
As shown in Table 3, slightly more observations have signed an agreement with the IMF
in the restricted sample: 24.3% in SSA and 22.8% in ROW. Like before, differences in
the external balance and in previous engagement with the IMF remain important contrib-
utors to the difference in characteristics part, accounting, respectively, for a 4.2 and 0.3
percentage points higher probability of concluding a new agreement in SSA. Additionally,
differences in some variables that had a numerical p-value of slightly above 0.1 before,
now gain qualitative importance: The lower GDP per capita in SSA contributes to a
14.4 percentage points lower probability of concluding an agreement in this region, since
higher income levels are positively related to program participation (see also Moser and
Sturm, 2011).11 Economic globalization and a better quality of government, by contrast,
are connected to a lower likelihood of initiating a new agreement in the base group; thus,
the lower values for these indicators in SSA contribute to a 10.9 and 2.8 percentage point
higher probability of signing an agreement in this region. Since ethnic fractionalization
is connected to a higher probability of program participation, countries in SSA are 10.5
percentage points more likely to enter an agreement, all else equal. Differences in external
debt between SSA and ROW are less important than before.
10 Descriptive statistics for the data used in the robustness analysis are available in Table A.2 in Appendix
A. Variables used by Sturm et al. (2005) that are highly correlated or accounted for by other covariates
in X, or that are captured by the time-dummies, are excluded from the robustness check.
11 The results of the logit models are available in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
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SSA ROW
Probability of signing agreement 24.342 *** (0.000) 22.811 *** (0.000)
difference in difference in
characteristics parameters
International reserves 2.386 (0.200) 7.963 (0.332)
Real GDP growth 0.105 (0.519) 1.322 (0.765)
Log(GDP pc) -14.360 ** (0.041) 48.813 (0.587)
Investment -0.303 (0.767) -0.921 (0.957)
Debt service -0.591 (0.245) -7.712 (0.473)
External debt (% of GNI) 2.252 (0.487) -38.195 ** (0.013)
External balance (% of GDP) 4.201 *** (0.003) 8.336 (0.273)
Economic globalization (KOF index) 10.883 ** (0.032) 19.878 (0.515)
Terms of trade adjustment 0.230 (0.715) 0.116 (0.872)
Inflation -0.880 (0.104) 5.301 (0.481)
Government budget deficit 0.183 (0.912) 0.124 (0.989)
Fixed exchange rate 0.616 (0.791) 9.931 (0.288)
Currency crisis 0.002 (0.997) -1.973 * (0.087)
Financial openness -2.388 (0.200) 4.081 (0.284)
Share of past 5 years with IMF 0.323 ** (0.041) -33.189 *** (0.005)
Lagged executive elections 0.220 (0.232) 2.019 (0.413)
Lagged legislative elections -0.440 (0.211) 1.651 (0.568)
Lead executive elections 0.085 (0.884) -2.597 (0.336)
Lead legislative elections -0.100 (0.689) 3.166 (0.303)
Political instability 0.128 (0.903) 7.350 (0.267)
Social unrest -0.917 (0.291) 2.921 (0.171)
Political rights and civil liberties -3.150 (0.141) -48.074 ** (0.023)
Political globalization (KOF index) -1.478 (0.500) -40.360 (0.176)
Quality of government 2.822 ** (0.041) -6.703 (0.821)
UN Security Council membership 0.251 (0.293) -0.494 (0.541)
Share in world GDP -0.945 (0.739) 22.544 (0.183)
Trade with US 1.918 (0.239) 5.519 (0.381)
Vote in line with the US in UNGA -2.143 (0.131) 51.859 ** (0.032)
Ethnic fractionalization 10.498 ** (0.025) 20.783 (0.735)
Share of IMF quota 1.529 (0.723) 5.629 (0.749)
Special interest in parliament -0.094 (0.559) 5.355 (0.204)
Political cohesion 1.562 (0.388) 1.154 (0.424)
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 0.098 (0.527) 6.978 (0.783)
Time dummies (joint effect) 0.059 (0.853) -73.603 (0.156)
Contribution to total difference 12.558 (0.157) -11.027 (0.228)
Note: Numerical p-values, based on the sign of the parameter estimates of
the Markov chains, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3: Decomposition results (robustness analaysis)
The robustness check reinforces the finding that economic and political factors have sub-
stantially different effects on the likelihood of concluding an IMF agreement in SSA. The
difference in parameters parts confirm the differential impact of external debt, past in-
volvement with the IMF, and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, with larger
effects as compared to the baseline analysis. Additionally, we find that the occurrence of
currency crises and higher values of political rights and civil liberties impact negatively
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on the signature of IMF agreements in SSA, while their effect is much less important in
ROW; this contributes, respectively, to a 1.9 and 48.1 percentage points lower probability
of signing an agreement in SSA.12
5 Discussion
Our analysis indicates that the selection of countries into IMF programs follows different
considerations in SSA as compared to other world regions. The impact of the different
data generating process underlying IMF lending in SSA is quantitatively more important
than the difference in economic and political environments that countries in SSA face.
This has important implications for empirical studies that use Heckman selection models
or propensity score matching to correct potential selection bias when evaluating the ef-
fects of IMF programs; allowing for interactions of regional dummies with economic and
political variables can substantially improve the prediction of countries’ program partic-
ipation, which is crucial for obtaining reliable results of the impact of IMF programs on
the variables of interest.
Our research also opens the door for more detailed analyses of the reasons for the dif-
ferences found. Furthermore, while most empirical studies do not explicitly distinguish
between the determinants of concessional and non-concessional lending programs when
modeling selection, this would be important for future research; it could well be that the
results for SSA are influenced by the concessional character of most of their agreements.
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A Data appendix
12
SSA sample
Cameroon 2003, 2004
Ethiopia 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Gabon 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Ghana 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Kenya 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Madagascar 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Malawi 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
Mali 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Mozambique 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Niger 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
Senegal 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Tanzania 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Togo 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Uganda 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Zambia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
ROW sample
Albania 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Algeria 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993,
Argentina 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Armenia 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Azerbaijan 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Bangladesh 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Belarus 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Bolivia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Brazil 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Bulgaria 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Chile 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Colombia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
Costa Rica 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Croatia 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Ecuador 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
El Salvador 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Guatemala 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Guyana 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Haiti 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995,
Honduras 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
India 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Indonesia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Jordan 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Kazakhstan 2002, 2003, 2004
Latvia 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Malaysia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Mexico 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Moldova 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Morocco 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Nicaragua 2002, 2003, 2004
Pakistan 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Panama 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Paraguay 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Peru 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Philippines 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Poland 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Romania 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Thailand 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Tunisia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Turkey 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Ukraine 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Uruguay 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Vietnam 2003, 2004
Table A.1: Country-year coverage (baseline estimation)
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ROW sample SSA sample
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
IMF program 0.228 0.420 0.243 0.431
International reserves 3.993 2.035 2.493 1.641
Real GDP growth 3.698 4.253 3.644 4.261
Log(GDP pc) 7.420 0.819 5.806 0.899
Investment 21.070 5.615 18.508 5.483
Debt service 21.677 13.864 18.804 12.477
External debt (% of GNI) 60.207 41.239 104.688 46.419
External balance (% of GDP) -4.513 8.037 -8.426 10.984
Economic globalization (KOF index) 52.483 13.812 36.416 8.867
Terms of trade adjustment -0.764 3.687 -1.348 6.181
Inflation 13.109 16.540 10.182 11.064
Government budget deficit 15.039 10.183 7.611 4.224
Fixed exchange rate 0.168 0.374 0.500 0.502
Currency crisis 0.078 0.269 0.086 0.281
Financial openness 0.173 1.399 -0.644 0.897
Share of past 5 years with IMF 0.247 0.207 0.278 0.163
Lagged executive elections 0.138 0.346 0.164 0.372
Lagged legislative elections 0.251 0.434 0.204 0.404
Lead executive elections 0.154 0.362 0.211 0.409
Lead legislative elections 0.253 0.435 0.217 0.414
Political instability 0.456 1.869 -0.427 0.441
Social unrest 0.431 1.727 -0.206 0.881
Political rights and civil liberties 3.287 1.270 4.220 1.182
Political globalization (KOF index) 70.283 14.966 59.362 15.560
Quality of government 0.501 0.143 0.427 0.101
UN Security Council membership 0.097 0.296 0.053 0.224
Share in world GDP 0.316 0.502 0.017 0.010
Trade with US 0.107 0.115 0.046 0.084
Vote in line with the US in UNGA 0.321 0.116 0.277 0.082
Ethnic fractionalization 0.408 0.213 0.755 0.091
Share of IMF quota 0.431 0.480 0.080 0.042
Special interest in parliament 0.150 0.211 0.139 0.271
Political cohesion 0.728 0.912 0.072 0.260
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 13.006 4.505 13.409 3.412
Observations 434 152
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics (robustness analysis)
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B Supplementary tables
ROW sample SSA sample
coef. p-value converg. coef. p-value converg.
International reserves -0.867 (0.395) 1.00 -0.196 (0.889) 1.00
Real GDP growth 0.431 (0.381) 1.00 0.726 (0.276) 1.00
Log(GDP pc) 5.705 (0.123) 1.00 4.809 (0.568) 1.00
Investment -0.226 (0.616) 1.00 0.165 (0.832) 1.00
Debt service 0.245 (0.105) 1.00 -0.026 (0.977) 1.00
External debt (% of GNI) 0.110 ** (0.037) 1.00 -0.154 * (0.063) 1.00
External balance (% of GDP) -0.768 *** (0.003) 1.00 -0.882 (0.135) 1.00
Economic globalization (KOF index) -0.374 (0.133) 1.00 0.547 (0.217) 1.00
Terms of trade adjustment -0.484 (0.349) 1.00 0.697 (0.133) 1.00
Inflation 0.146 (0.268) 1.00 0.286 (0.504) 1.00
Government budget deficit 0.028 (0.895) 1.00 0.340 (0.721) 1.00
Fixed exchange rate 2.790 (0.647) 1.00 10.659 (0.263) 1.00
Currency crisis -3.868 (0.509) 1.00 -14.776 * (0.071) 1.00
Financial openness 2.005 (0.249) 1.00 -0.640 (0.845) 1.00
Share of past 5 years with IMF 20.238 ** (0.040) 1.00 -66.826 ** (0.031) 1.00
Lagged executive elections 8.091 (0.220) 1.00 9.914 (0.271) 1.00
Lagged legislative elections 6.694 (0.199) 1.00 11.684 (0.136) 1.00
Lead executive elections -1.134 (0.792) 1.00 -6.066 (0.371) 1.00
Lead legislative elections 4.544 (0.379) 1.00 6.968 (0.399) 1.00
Political instability 0.072 (0.913) 1.00 4.418 (0.556) 1.00
Social unrest 1.128 (0.293) 1.00 -0.193 (0.992) 1.00
Political rights and civil liberties -1.913 (0.289) 1.00 -4.317 * (0.099) 1.00
Political globalization (KOF index) 0.145 (0.393) 1.00 -0.071 (0.777) 1.00
Quality of government -25.06 (0.129) 1.00 3.855 (0.900) 1.00
UN Security Council membership -6.017 (0.312) 1.00 -11.008 (0.305) 1.00
Share in world GDP 0.777 (0.888) 1.00 658.185 (0.109) 1.00
Trade with US -23.233 (0.287) 1.00 80.482 (0.279) 1.00
Vote in line with the US in UNGA 33.665 (0.136) 1.00 119.376 ** (0.021) 1.00
Time dummies yes yes
Observations 469 189
Note: The table reports average marginal effects, multiplied by 100 (coef.). Numerical p-values, based on
the sign of the parameter estimates of the Markov chains, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. converg. refers to Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) convergence diagnostic. SSA refers to
Sub-Saharan Africa and ROW stands for the rest of the world.
Table B.1: Bayesian logit results: average marginal effects (baseline)
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ROW sample SSA sample
coef. p-value converg. coef. p-value converg.
International reserves -1.345 (0.200) 1.00 1.394 (0.537) 1.00
Real GDP growth 0.325 (0.524) 1.00 0.441 (0.537) 1.00
Log(GDP pc) 7.493 ** (0.041) 1.00 10.827 (0.343) 1.00
Investment 0.142 (0.767) 1.00 0.056 (0.965) 1.00
Debt service 0.180 (0.245) 1.00 -0.178 (0.645) 1.00
External debt (% of GNI) 0.043 (0.487) 1.00 -0.227 ** (0.023) 1.00
External balance (% of GDP) -0.870 *** (0.003) 1.00 -1.199 ** (0.029) 1.00
Economic globalization (KOF index) -0.575 ** (0.032) 1.00 0.005 (0.980) 1.00
Terms of trade adjustment -0.166 (0.751) 1.00 -0.206 (0.707) 1.00
Inflation 0.226 (0.104) 1.00 0.479 (0.313) 1.00
Government budget deficit -0.023 (0.912) 1.00 -0.019 (1.000) 1.00
Fixed exchange rate 1.622 (0.791) 1.00 14.287 (0.260) 1.00
Currency crisis -5.476 (0.336) 1.00 -19.150 ** (0.029) 1.00
Financial openness 2.353 (0.200) 1.00 -2.962 (0.463) 1.00
Share of past 5 years with IMF 21.720 ** (0.025) 1.00 -76.467 ** (0.015) 1.00
Lagged executive elections 7.925 (0.232) 1.00 12.936 (0.153) 1.00
Lagged legislative elections 6.669 (0.211) 1.00 9.447 (0.272) 1.00
Lead executive elections 1.405 (0.884) 1.00 -7.435 (0.311) 1.00
Lead legislative elections 2.331 (0.689) 1.00 11.387 (0.201) 1.00
Political instability -0.166 (0.903) 1.00 -11.075 (0.259) 1.00
Social unrest 1.138 (0.291) 1.00 -6.704 (0.236) 1.00
Political rights and civil liberties -2.788 (0.141) 1.00 -10.037 *** (0.003) 1.00
Political globalization (KOF index) 0.125 (0.500) 1.00 -0.395 (0.229) 1.00
Quality of government -35.972 ** (0.041) 1.00 -34.230 (0.475) 1.00
UN Security Council membership -6.115 (0.293) 1.00 -10.066 (0.383) 1.00
Share in world GDP 2.603 (0.739) 1.00 923.174 (0.181) 1.00
Trade with US -27.390 (0.239) 1.00 66.668 (0.497) 1.00
Vote in line with the US in UNGA 35.707 (0.131) 1.00 154.966 ** (0.017) 1.00
Ethnic fractionalization 26.124 ** (0.025) 1.00 36.475 (0.511) 1.00
Share of IMF quota -4.012 (0.723) 1.00 44.417 (0.760) 1.00
Special interest in parliament 17.463 * (0.100) 1.00 35.062 ** (0.041) 1.00
Political cohesion -2.101 (0.388) 1.00 9.107 (0.484) 1.00
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 0.361 (0.521) 1.00 0.593 (0.640) 1.00
Time dummies yes yes
Observations 434 152
Note: The table reports average marginal effects, multiplied by 100 (coef.). Numerical p-values, based on
the sign of the parameter estimates of the Markov chains, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. converg. refers to Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) convergence diagnostic. SSA refers to
Sub-Saharan Africa and ROW stands for the rest of the world.
Table B.2: Bayesian logit results: average marginal effects (robustness)
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